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INTRODUCTION

This is the reply brief on the cross appeal of Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant City
of Hayden ("Hayden" or "City"). 1 It follows Hayden's Response Brief of Respondent and
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant ("Hayden's Opening Brief'). It responds to the North Idaho
Building Contractors Association's Reply Brief and Cross-Appeal Response Brief("Builders'
Reply Brief') of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents North Idaho Building Contractors

Association, et al. ("Builders").2
The City recognizes that it faces a tough standard in seeking reversal of an exercise of
discretion regarding attorney fees. The City suggests, however, that this is one of those cases
where abuse of discretion is sufficiently apparent that reversal is appropriate.
To justify reversal, Hayden must show either that (I) the district court failed to recognize
the discretionary nature of its decision, (2) that it acted outside the bounds of such discretion or
inconsistently with applicable legal standards, or (3) that it failed to reach its decision through an
exercise ofreason. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P .3d 1114, 1125 (2009). Hayden
respectfully suggests that the district court did not meet the second and/or third test. This is
because the district court identified clear controlling precedent, explained how each of the
Builders' legal arguments was inconsistent with that authority, and then inexplicably concluded
that a fee award was not justified because the Builders had litigated in "good faith."

Plaintiff North Idaho Building Contractors Association ("NIBCA") appealed the judgment entered in
favor of the City that was based on the district court's determination that the City's sewer capitalization fee
comported with Idaho law. The City cross appealed the denial of its request for attorney fees.
1

2 Hayden employs the same shorthand references to documents in the record as set out in Hayden's
Opening Brief at 12-14.
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I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF HAYDEN'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST SHOULD
BE OVERTURNED.

A.

The Builders pursued this litigation without a reasonable basis.

The district court concluded that "the authority was not so clear as to preclude good faith
litigation of the issue." Decision on Fees at 13 (R. Vol. 4, p. 818). That statement, standing
alone, sounds like an exercise of discretion that might be difficult to overturn. But it does not
stand alone. The conclusion that the authority was "not so clear" cannot be reconciled with the
district court's thoughtful and carefully articulated explanation of how each of the Builders' legal
arguments was inconsistent with statutes and precedent. As the district court recognized: "As to
the legal issues brought before the Court, the Court was able to reach its conclusion based upon
existing Idaho statutory and case law that had previously addressed fees similar to the City's and
that said law authorized the City to collect sewer capitalization fees as a matter of law."

Decision on Fees at 12-13 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 817-18). If that is so, attorney fees should have been
awarded.
The Builders complain that "there is not one statute or Idaho appellate court decision that
has dealt exclusively with whether municipalities may charge capitalization fees solely to fund
future expansion projects." Builders' Reply Brief at 9. In fact, the central issue presented hereHayden's use ofreplacement cost for system capacity consumed by the new user-was decided
in Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation Dist., 149 Idaho 187,233 P.3d 118 (2010)
(Eismann, C.J.). 3 This Court held:

3

The Viking case built on the firm foundation laid by Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d
1272 (1991) (Boyle, J.). Both Viking and Loomis say that a connection fee may be imposed equal to "the value of
that portion of the system capacity that the new user will utilize." Viking, 149 Idaho at 194,233 P.3d at 125
(emphasis supplied) (quoting Loomis, 119 Idaho at 443, 807 P.2d at 1281 ). Viking then answered the question left
open by Loomis, holding that the revenues may be spent on construction of new capacity to serve future demand.
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Thus, this section permitted the Irrigation District to charge new
users of the domestic water system a connection fee that included
an amount equal to the value of that portion of the svstem capacity
that the new user will utilize at that point in time.
The Irrigation District had discretion to decide what
methodology to use in order to determine that value. For example,
it is entitled to use replacement cost rather than historical cost as
the basis of its calculations.
Viking, 149 Idaho at 194, 233 P.3d at 125 (emphasis supplied).
Viking further held that the bond act 4 authorizes expenditures to "extend works" and that
"[s]pending revenues from connection fees for these purposes would be consistent with the Act."
Viking, 149 Idaho at 197, 233 P.3d at 128. In other words, fees based on consumption of system
capacity may not only be quantified based on replacement cost, but may also actually be used to
construct that new system capacity. Kind of a no brainer.
Despite Viking's clear holding, which disposes of their central argument, the Builders
insist they were justified in ignoring the precedent: "In advancing this argument, the City
ignored the fundamental basis of the decision in Viking. Viking held that a fee to buy into a
current system would not be invalid just because it resulted in incidental reserves for replacing or
improving the system." Builders' Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis supplied). It is unclear what the
Builders are talking about. Viking contains no reference to "incidental reserves." There was
nothing incidental about the irrigation district's use of connection fees to fund future
construction. To the contrary: "The record reflects the primary purpose of hook-on fees was to
pay for future capital assets and future improvements due to population growth." Viking, 149

Viking, of course, applied the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act ("Irrigation
District Bond Act") §§ 43-1906 to 43-1920, which this Court recognized is functionally identical to the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 50-1027 to 50-1042. Viking, 149 Idaho at 191,233 P.3d at 122. The
corresponding provisions authorizing "extension of works" are found in section 50-1030(a) of the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act and section 43-1909( a) of the Irrigation District Bond Act. Viking also relied on section 43-1909( e) of the
Irrigation District Bond Act, which is functionally identical to section 50-I030(t) ofthe Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
4
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Idaho at 196, 233 P.3d at 127 (emphasis supplied). The Court upheld fees based on the
replacement cost of the system capacity consumed and said those revenues could be spent on
new system capacity. "The important issue was ... that they were not used for city functions
other than the sewer and water systems." Viking, 149 Idaho at 197,233 P.3d at 128 (emphasis
original). Viking is on all fours with the case at bar, and the Builders were unreasonable in
ignoring it.
Builders then complain that the "City's fee is not an equity buy-in fee" because it does
not meet the Viking test that the fee "must be based upon some calculation designed to determine
the value of that portion of the system the user will be utilizing." Builders' Reply Brief at 4
(quoting Viking, 149 Idaho at 194, 233 P .3d at 125). But Hayden readily meets that requirement.
Importantly, the Builders skip over the preceding sentence in the Viking decision in which the
Court held: "For example, it is entitled to use replacement cost rather than historical cost as the
basis of its calculations." Viking, 149 Idaho at 194,233 P.3d at 125. That, of course, is exactly
what Hayden did. Indeed, the Welch Comer Report (A.R. pp. 5-118)), prepared by the highly
regarded engineering firm of the same name, was precisely the sort of technical analysis of
replacement cost for consumed capacity that the Court found missing in Viking (resulting in a
remand).
Proceeding in the face of Loomis and Viking is sufficient, in itself, to justify an award of fees.
The unreasonableness of pursuing this litigation is further reinforced by the separate authority under
Idaho Code § 63-1311. The Builders' contention that they may ignore the teaching of Kootenai
County Property Owners Assn. v. Kootenai County ("Kootenai Property Owners"), 115 Idaho
676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989) (Bakes, J.) because that case dealt with a different user fee statute does
not hold up. Sure, the statute in Kootenai Property Owners is different. But section 63-1311 is
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even broader in that it authorizes cities to impose user fees to fund anything that may be "funded by
property tax revenues." Obviously sewer expansions may be funded by property tax revenues. If
that is not clear from the statute, it is certainly clear in the legislative history-which the Builders
have ignored throughout this litigation. See Hayden's Opening Brief at 16 n.9.
As it has acknowledged, Hayden's argument that the Legislature extended home rule to
cities (at least as to proprietary functions and perhaps to others) in its 1976 amendment to Idaho
Code§ 50-301 is "cutting edge stuff'-quite the opposite of well-settled law. Hayden's
Opening Brief at 36. However, this is merely an additional (and, admittedly more far reaching)

argument. It is cumulative with the well-settled law that has already nailed the Builders' coffin
shut. Irrespective of how the Court rules on section 50-301, it was unreasonable for the Builders
to proceed with this litigation in light of the other plain precedents.
B.

Hayden was the overall prevailing party.

In its brief, the Builders cite the recent decision by this Court in Idaho Military Historical
Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 2014 WL 2735320 (Idaho June 17, 2014) (Schroeder, J. pro tern.). This

is curious. The new case reinforces prior precedent holding that a party may be the overall
prevailing party despite not having won every single issue. (See discussion in Hayden's
Opening Brief at 37-38.)

The case involved a dispute over a PT23 Fairchild airplane donated to an aviation
museum by then Micron President Steve Appleton. When the museum ran low on funds to store
the plane, it accepted an offer from defendants Maslen and another aviation museum to house the
plane. Sometime later, the original museum decided to give the plane to a third aviation museum
(the plaintiff). Upon learning of this, the defendants filed a $12,025 lien on the plane and refused
to surrender possession to the plaintiff museum. The district court ordered the defendants to
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surrender possession of the plane to the plaintiff but denied the plaintiff's $796,218 damage
claims as well as $14,630 in counterclaims by the defendants. Although the plaintiff did not
prevail on its $796,218 damage claims, the district court found that it was nonetheless the
prevailing party, because securing title and possession of the plane was the key goal of the
litigation. This Court affirmed.
In so ruling, the Court disavowed language in Nampa & lvferidian Irrigation Dist. v.

Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 522, 20 P.3d 702, 706 (2001) (Walters, J.) suggesting
that a party could escape an attorney fee award in an otherwise frivolously litigated case if it
managed to present a single triable issue:
Arguably, a single, triable issue of fact may excuse a party from
the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the
conduct of the lawsuit. This Court does back away from and
clarify the overly strict application ofidaho Code section 12-121
set forth in Nampa Meridian. Apportionment of attorney fees is
appropriate for those elements of the case that were frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation. Apportionment of costs and
fees is common even for district courts, and this step back from the
language of Nampa Meridian is consistent with the general
principles of apportioning costs and fees.

Idaho Military Historical Society at *7.
Although Idaho Military Historical Society arose in the context of section 12-121, the
case was decided on the basis ofldaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B), which applies equally to section
12-117 (and every other prevailing party statute). Idaho Military Historical Society at *4.
Consequently, it is good precedent for this case.
In sum, Idaho Military Historical Society makes clear that attorney fees may be awarded
to the overall prevailing party, which is determined based on a broad view of the action that
identifies the principal issues and goals in the case. In some instances, that award may be
reduced where less important issues are pursued by the other party in a non-frivolous fashion.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT CITY OF HAYDEN
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This is consistent with the express language ofldaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B) as well as the
provisions in both 12-117(1) and (2).
In short, Hayden is entitled to an award as the overall prevailing party. In the larger
scheme of things, the City's inadvertent and largely self-cancelling accounting errors did not
amount to much. They pale when considered against the core issue in the case-the right to
impose cap fees that will fund replacement of the capacity consumed by new sewer customers
thus ensuring that the City may continue to provide vital infrastructure to accommodate growth
in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible. The Builders are not immunized from
an award simply because they arguably prevailed as to a few erroneous accounting entries in the
mountain of transactions that took place over the years.
We say "arguably" prevailed because this was a pyrrhic victory for them at best. Before
they were corrected, the inadvertent accounting errors worked, on balance, in the Builders'
interest. Correcting them made the Builders worse off. The key point is that the substantial and
intentional misuse of funds for non-sewer projects, which the Builders were convinced was
taking place, simply did not occur. This costly litigation was hardly necessary to figure that out.
The Builders could have obtained all the records they received in discovery simply by asking for
them under the Public Records Act. Indeed, they were given unlimited access to those records
and to city staff prior to this litigation being filed. 5

5 This is acknowledged in the Builders' own complaint: "NIBCA has obtained City accounting records that
detail the collection and use of the Capitalization Fees. The records identified nearly 20 capital projects tied to
sewage system expansion from 2005to2011." Amended Complaint, XVII at 4 (R. Vol. 1, p. 35). After reviewing
the City's accounting information with the help of their own accountant and with the full cooperation of city staff,
the Builders wrote the City saying: "Based on the substantial investigation and research performed by NIBCA, my
client and I are in agreement with your statement that, 'Neither the HARSB nor the City capitalization fees are used
for maintenance and repair of the system." Jameson Letter (R. Vol. 2, p. 330).
The extent of the City's cooperation with the Builders, both before and after the litigation was initiated, is
further documented in Letter from Christopher H. Meyer to John R. Jameson (Oct. 22, 2012), Meyer Affidavit #2,
Exh. 11 (R. Vol. 2. pp. 353-56).
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C.

On whole, the Builders prevailed even as to the accounting issue.

There is no question that the City prevailed on the gravamen of the case (its authority to
charge a cap fee based on the replacement value of the system capacity consumed by new users
and its right to use such funds to build new capacity to replace that which was consumed). That
this was the main point of the case is evident from the complaint, which focused squarely on the
question of whether cap fees may be used for future expansion of the sewer system and
mentioned the issue of accounting only in a passing reference. 6
The law on this legal authority question is clear. Accordingly, the Builders' challenge to
the City's authority was unreasonable.
As for the accounting issue, the City has acknowledged making some inadvertent errors.
Despite this, the City prevailed overall even as to the accounting issue, and the Builders position
was unreasonable. Here is why.
First, the Builders gained nothing by this litigation, and the City was made better off.
The net effect of correcting the largely self-cancelling errors is that the City is now in a position
to charge slightly more for cap fees the next time they are adjusted.
Second, at the end of the day, the Builders stipulated away their accounting issue claims,
without a nickel being paid to the Builders. Stipulation (R. Vol. 3, pp. 669-73). That stipulation
was silent as to attorney fees, meaning that the City is free to seek them. Straub v. Smith, 145

6 "By its own admission, the City of Hayden has been and continues to utilize the Capitalization Fees for
sewage system capital projects that expand the system's capacity." Amended Complaint, 1 XLII(a) at 9 (R. Vol. I, p.
40). Other references to the "future expansion" theme are found throughout the complaint. Amended Complaint,
11 XIV, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XLI, XLII(c), XLIX, L, LVIII, LIX(c), and LXV at 4, 5, 9, IO, I I, 12, and 13 (R. Vol.
I, p. 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44). The complaint contains no specific allegation that funds were misspent. The
closest it comes is this vague statement: "There is weak or woeful lack of accounting for the Capitalization Fees,
which are utilized as general revenues for capital expansion projects or for other purposes on an 'ad hoc' basis."
Amended Complaint, 1 XLII( c) at 9 (R. Vol. I, p. 40).
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Idaho 65, 73, 175 P.3d 754, 133 (2007).
Third, the City prevailed on the real accounting issue. The Builders would have hit pay
dirt had they been able to show that the City was using its cap fee revenues for something other
than sewer projects, as the Builders inexplicably alleged was the case. 7 See, e.g., footnote 2 in
Hayden's Opening Brief dealing with the Government Way project, which is further discussed in

the Meyer/Phillips Letters (R. Vol. 2, pp. 369-75). As it turns out, of course, the City never spent
any of the cap fee funds on non-sewer projects. The only accounting errors were ones in which
sewer expenses that should have been allocated to operation and maintenance were inadvertently
allocated to capital expenses, and vice versa. The City immediately corrected those incorrect
accounting entries upon finding them.
Let us be real here. It is unlikely that the books of any municipality or corporation do not
contain some accounting errors. We are mortals. Such mistakes arc a far cry from the situation
involved in those cases where governmental entities have purposefully charged fees with the
intent to use those funds as a source of revenue for general city purposes. E.g., Brewster v. City
of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). That did not happen here, and there was no

basis for the Builders to allege otherwise. Accordingly, looking to the guts of the accounting
dispute as required under Rule 54( d)( 1)(B ), it is apparent that the City prevailed. The elephant
that the Builders were looking for was not in the room.
D.

At a minimum, Hayden is entitled to a partial award under section
12-117(2).

Hayden contends that it was the prevailing party as to both the merits and the accounting
issue side show, and that the Builders' positions on both were frivolous. However, if the Court

7 The Builders alleged: "[T]he Capitalization Fees ... are utilized as general revenues for capital
expansion projects or for other purposes on an 'ad hoc' basis." Amended Complaint~ XLII at 9 (R. Vol. 1, p. 40).
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were to determine either that the Builders prevailed on the accounting issue or that their pursuit
of that issue was not frivolous, Hayden is entitled, at the very least, to a partial award under
Idaho Code § 12-117(2).
Indeed, the statute and Rule 54( d)(l )(B) are crystal clear. The Builders have no argument
to make against a partial award. This, presumably, explains why they simply ignored the issue
of a partial award despite the fact that the City briefed it in detail under its own heading.
Hayden's Opening Brief at 37, 40-42.
Some time ago, this Court equated the "reasonable basis" standard under section 12-117
with the "frivolous" standard under section 12-121. The effect of Idaho Military Historical
Society is to provide that the two statutes also work the same as to partial awards, making them
both consistent with the guidance provided by Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). This simplifies the
law, and is consistent with common sense.
In sum, the prevailing party rule may be summarized as follows: If the parties fight to a
draw (each winning substantial aspects of the case that roughly cancel each other out), then no
attorney fees are awarded to either party. If one party is the overall prevailing party (winning the
gravamen of the case), that party is entitled to a fee award. In the discretion of the court, the
award may be adjusted downward to exclude compensation as to those issues on which the nonoverall-prevailing party prevailed or, at least, litigated with a reasonable basis.
E.

Hayden's attorney fees are reasonable for a case of this import, but
that issue is not before the Court.

The Builders complain that Hayden's attorney fees were too high. That issue is not
properly raised here. In the event this Court determines that an award is appropriate, it will
remand the issue and the Builders may make their points at that time.
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Moreover, the Builders fail to identify any particular aspect of the billing that is
inappropriate. Instead, their argument boils down to the observation that their attorneys' fees
were much lower. That is not surprising. It is not particularly expensive to make baseless
allegations and issue sweeping discovery requests. Essentially, the Builders threw something on
the wall to see if it would stick. The City, however, had no choice but to treat the litigation with
the utmost seriousness. 8 That is reflected in the contrasting depth of research and analysis
offered by the two sides. 9 In short, the Builders had no right to assume that the City would
approach the litigation with the same lack of rigor reflected in the filing of this suit.
In any event, if there is a remand, the district court may take this up in due course based
on whatever guidance this Court may provide.
II.

HAYDEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON THE PENDING APPEAL.

A.

The Builders had no reasonable basis to appeal the district court's
well-reasoned decision.

In their reply brief, the Builders set out no separate argument on the issue of attorney fees
on appeal. Instead, they simply stated that fees should be denied "for the same reasons."

8

One might add that it is more expensive to respond to discovery than to simply ask for every conceivable

document.
9 The Builders have established a pattern of ignoring issues and precedents that do not work for them. For
example, the Builders declined to respond substantively to the argument presented by the City, Hayden's Opening
Brief at 31-36, that the Legislature extended home rule to cities in 1976. Instead of addressing the merits, the
Builders object that Hayden presented the argument for the first time on appeal. In doing so, however, the Builders
failed even to acknowledge-much less respond to--Hayden's explanation that the bar to raising legal arguments
for the first time on appeal does not apply to a respondent offering an alternative basis for upholding the lower
court's decision, Hayden's Opening Brief at 15 n.6. Ignoring this key point, the Builders cite only a case in which
the appellant was not allowed to raise new issues on appeal, Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 156 Idaho 127,
322 P.3d 980 (2014) (Burdick, C.J.). Thus, with no good basis, the Builders sidestep a potentially game-changing
statute.
Other times, the Builders simply make things up. Take this quotation from Builders' Reply Brief at 2-3:
"The second source of authority the City cites is Idaho Code § 50-1027 et. [sic] seq, the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
... This is known as the equity buy-in theory, and is based on the value of a current existing system." As discussed
above, the Viking Court made amply clear that equity buy-in may be based on either the value of the existing system
or on its replacement cost. Viking, 149 Idaho at 194, 233 P.3d at 125.
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Builders' Reply Brief at 14. This ignores the point made in Hayden's Opening Brief at 42-43.
Even if the Builders escape attorney fees below, they should be assessed attorney fees on appeal
because, with the benefit and teaching of the district court's well-reasoned opinion, the appeal
was all the more unreasonable. Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419,424
(2005) (Trout, J.)
The Builders also ignore the observation made in Hayden's Opening Brief at 43 that the
standard is different on appeal. Even if the Court were to find that the district court's denial of
fees was not an abuse of discretion, the Court could reach a different conclusion as to fees when
it exercises its own discretion on appeal.
B.

If Haden prevails on the Builders' appeal, but not on its own cross
appeal, it is still entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

In Hayden's Opening Brief at 44-4 7, the City provided an extensive discussion of the
technical question of whether attorney fees are precluded on appeal if the denial of attorney fees
below is sustained. The Builders offer no response to, or even acknowledgement of, the
argument made on this subject.
The City will not repeat that discussion, except to offer this brief summary: The Court
should overturn its recent precedent holding that the loss of a cross appeal on attorney fees
precludes an award of fees on appeal to the party that prevails on the merits. It does not follow
from the earlier cases cited in more recent decisions, and it is at odds with Idaho Code § 12-117
and Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). In any event, at a minimum, the City is entitled to a partial
award as to those issues on which it prevails on appeal.
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CONCLUSION

To quote the Builders, "If ever there was a case in controversy ripe for resolution by the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, this case is it." Builders' Reply Brief at 1. Proceeding in
the face of such clearly articulated precedent cannot be described as reasonable.
For all of the reasons discussed above and in its prior briefing, the City urges the Court to
overturn the district court's denial of the City's attorney fee request. Hayden urges that it is the
overall prevailing party on all issues. In the event that the Court finds that the Builders prevailed
in part or had a reasonable basis as to some claims but not others, the Court should remand to the
district court with instructions to make an appropriate adjustment in the award.
Respectfully submitted on July 18, 2014.
GIVENS PURSLEY
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